Health for life

"Maybe you should go back to the hospital!"

Ask most wonks - especially ones who never took care of a patient - about "readmissions," and, after quoting this article, these health policy Urkels will tell you that returning to a hospital is the poster-child of all that ails U.S. medical care. Providers who cant get it right the first time, they say, are not only giving slipshod care, but are double dipping because their mistakes generate even more fat fees the second time around.

"Balderdash!" says the Disease Management Care Blog. Many Medicare inpatients are so sick that its a miracle that they get to go home in the first place.  Keeping patients in the hospital can be more life-threatening than the home environment and, when things dont get well after a discharge, its often more a function of social support than medical skill. 

That doesnt mean that CMS is going to listen to docs and back off of its Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP). Using risk-adjusted actuarial projections, every U.S. hospital will be prone to a possible payment reduction if their observed rate of readmissions for heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia exceeds the expected rate. Based on those projections, approximately two thirds of hospitals could be penalized.

Writing in the New England Journal of Medicine, Karen Joynt and Ashish Jha point out that hospitals are concerned because 1) readmissions fall outside of their control and 2) the actuarial projections are imperfect.  As a result, hospitals that care for the most fragile and socioeconomically disadvantaged are at risk for paying more than their fair share of CMSs $280 million claw-back penalty. 

The NEJM authors recommend three modifications to CMS HRRP:

1. Include patients socioeconomic status in any risk adjustment modeling. One easy-to-obtain modifier, for example, could be whether the patient is on Supplemental Security Income.  Patients on SSI are less able to cope, which is why they quality for the program in the first place.

2. Include hospitals mortality rates in any risk adjustment modeling.  Hospitals with special expertise are less likely to have borderline patients die on their inpatient services, which means theyll have their more than their fair share of fragile survivors.

3. Limit the penalty to readmissions that occur within hours or days of a discharge, instead of the current problematic policy of counting any readmission that occurs within 30 days.  It makes sense to believe that a premature discharge or slipshod discharge planning is at fault if the patient returns within 3 days instead of three weeks.

Since its unlikely that HRRP program is going away, the DMCB agrees with the three recommendations.  In the meantime, it also suggests:

1. CMS should be held accountable by Congress to execute well on the program,

2) Claims analytics - possibly using a "Big Data" approach - should be applied to Medicare claims to examine whether hospitals are turning to two potential options to undermine the program:

a) gaming the system by altering how they "code" the billing for their readmission patients, or

b) accepting the penalty because of favorable income from readmissions.

Image from Wikipedia

If youre one of those disease management skeptics, you might enjoy the lingering anti-vendor schadenfreude of this bottom-up re-analysis of the MHS program that was just published in the New England Journal.  However, if you are a fan of the Feds programs for the Patient Centered Medical Home or Accountable Care Organizations, youll also want to pay close attention to a timely reminder about the perils of contracting with CMS.

The Disease Management Care Blog explains.

Recall MHS was a CMS program designed to test old fashioned disease management in fee-for-service Medicare.  A total of eight vendors launched their programs in separate geographic areas across the U.S. in the latter half of 2005.  Each area had about 30,000 beneficiaries with diabetes and heart failure who were randomized to disease management or usual care in a 2:1 ratio.  Participants were ill with an average of more than one recent hospitalization in the previous 12 months and more than $15,000 in baseline costs.  The programs consisted of remote call centers staffed by nurse-coaches who counselled patients on a regular basis.  Each of the vendors negotiated a monthly "at risk" administrative fee from CMS.  To retain the fee, the companies had to reduce costs in excess of the fee and simultaneously achieve a variety of quality and satisfaction targets vs. the usual care patients.  If they failed to save enough money, CMS clawed the money back.

The Journals reanalysis, involving more than 240,000 beneficiary-participants, didnt shed any new light on the original depressing report to Congress.  Among the eight vendors, the change in the per beneficiary per month (PBPM) cost ranged from $22 in savings to $38 in additional costs; most of the PBPM changes were in the single digits.  In contrast, the fees ranged between $74 to $159 per beneficiary per month.  Only three of the eight vendors had lower costs, none achieved statistical significance and none had savings that exceeded their fees. There were some improvements in quality, but they were spotty and quite modest.

Participation rates among eligible beneficiaries averaged 85%.  Mean telephone contacts per patient was .7 per month and ranged from .4 to 1 per month.  Patients were telephoned on average every 2.7 months; over a 30 month period, 59% were contacted at least 10 times and 23% were contacted fewer than 5 times. 

And what are the lessons?

The authors had five, all of which also apply to the medical home and ACOs.  The DMCB has two more.

1) Show me the money:  In retrospect, the research that led to MHS that suggested that disease management "worked" was imperfect.  By the way, the same can be said of the largely observational and underpowered research supporting medical homes and the total lack of any meaningful experience with ACOs.  Will these innovative care approaches share the same fate as MHS?  Based on what we know at this time, it cant be ruled out.

2) Needy patients:  Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes and heart failure are sick. The nurse-coaches were unprepared to meet all of their patients needs.  Medical homes and ACOs may end up being surprised also.

3) Analytics:  In the CMS "data dumps" to the vendors, it was difficult to find the patients who were the most vulnerable.  This good news is that modern predictive modeling analytics - despite its limitations - may enable medical homes and ACOs to target their care management at those patients with the greatest need and at the highest risk for increased costs.

4) Timely access to data: CMS data transfers to the vendors could be tardy, resulting in telephonic outreach to patients long after it could have done any good.  ACOs will need to worry about this in their dealings with CMS. 

5) The doctors: despite the vendors assurances, the disease management programs were not aligned with the beneficiaries doctors.  This is less likely to be a problem in medical homes and ACOs, but doesnt mean that they wont have to worry that their docs arent fully buying into the notion of teaming with non-physicians.

The DMCB offers two other lessons:

In retrospect, calling sick Medicare patients infrequently may have been one factor in MHS undoing.  The telephone will probably have a role to play for medical homes and ACOs, but the best mix of telephonic and face-to-face visits remains an open question.  At any rate, it seems that contacting patients at least every 30 days would be a good benchmark.

The DMCB remembers the confident "this is guaranteed to work!" hubris of yesterdays MHS architects and finds it eerily similar to the enthusiasm surrounding todays medical homes and ACOs. If the Medicare medical home and ACO programs dont work out, itll set these innovations back ten years or more.

Image from Wikipedia