Showing posts with label fee. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fee. Show all posts
Fee for Service Medicare Beneficiary Access to Care The Truth May Be More Complicated
Sunday, February 9, 2014
The Issue also says there "may" have been a "very small increase" in the number of docs who have dropped out of the Medicare program. Those drop-outs appear to be greatest among psychiatrists (1.1%) and plastic surgeons (1.6%). In contrast, only 0.35% of primary care physicians have dropped out. These drop-outs have been more than compensated for by the new physicians entering the labor market.
Except for 2012, these data are from the in person interviews that comprise the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey, The 2012 numbers are described as "interim," because they are based on a mail-in survey.
The Issue brief also quotes a separate MedPAC annual survey of thousands of Medicare beneficiaries. According to the brief, 77% reported they never experienced a delay in getting an appointment for routine care, compared with 76% in 2008.
Case closed, right? The Disease Management Care Blogs dire warnings about a widespread provider exit from Medicare that was echoed years later by the Wall Street Journal have been overblown.
Not exactly, speculates the DMCB, for the following reasons:
1. The DMCB pulled a copy of the NAMCS survey and found the question that was apparently used to assess physician participation. The screen shot is above. It generically ers to "Medicare," not fee-for-service Medicare. Because many physicians are members of insurance networks, an affirmative answer could be misinterpreted by the respondents as erring to Medicare Advantage.
2. There is a difference between "accepting" new patients vs. welcoming new patients. In this seminal New England Journal study, many respondents "accepted" "new" Medicaid beneficiaries, but moved them to the back of the appointment queue.
That being said, the MedPAC survey suggests that isnt happening - yet - to Medicare beneficiaries. And thats assuming a health care consumers definition of "delay" hasnt been dumbed down since 2005.
3. Last but not least, the NAMCS numbers represent a national average. Many areas of the country have seen consolidation of physician practices into larger groups. The DMCB suspects these entities are more willing to accommodate Medicare beneficiaries. Its very possible that the smaller physician-owned practices - many of whom practice in rural areas - are less likely to do so in 2013 than they were in 2008.
Coda:
In yesterdays post, the DMCB was introduced to "twerking." After additional inquiries of the DMCB spawn, it has learned more about this curious phenomenon.
Which led to this insight:
Q: What is one key similarity between twerking and being an ACO?
A: You better be caul doing both, otherwise you could get screwed.
.
Prospective Payment Good Fee For Service Bad Right Unless Youre a Patient That Is
Tuesday, January 28, 2014
| Applying the brake in the name of patient care? |
Go to the websites of organizations like Robert Wood Johnson or The Brookings Institution and youll find impressive expert papers that extol a variety of "payment orms" designed to "align incentives," "reduce waste" and "achieve cost savings." Dig into these orms and readers will encounter admiration for payment approaches like "prospective payment," case-based," "bundling," and "shared savings." Youll also find a deep disdain for "fee-for-service" (FFS).
Prospective good, FFS bad, right?
"Not always," replies the DMCB. It depends on your point of view. Like, if youre a patient.
The DMCB explains.
The DMCB learned long ago to simplistically think of provider payments in terms of "gas" and "brake" pedals. FFS applies gas and accelerates provider services; thats because each time a "service" is provided it subsequently generates a "fee."
In contrast to FFS, case payment, bundling and capitation apply the brakes, because providers receive the payments up-front. Since the money is in hand, providers have an economic incentive to preserve it and withhold services. The DMCB thinks of "shared savings" in terms of brakes because the up-front payment is essentially held in escrow until the savings (versus a targeted level of utilization) are achieved.
The simplest example of how this can be applied is to hospitalization. If hospitals are paid for each day that the patient is in a hospital, thats FFS (otherwise known in the industry as "per diem").
Instead of per diems, most hospitals are paid with a different payment mechanism based on "diagnosis related groups" (DRGs). Every time a patient is admitted, that generates a payment (similar to FFS). That payment, however, is not pegged to the number of days the patient stays in the hospital. Instead, the payment is bundled to pay for the entire hospitalization. Thats why hospitals are always willing to admit patients (the gas) and then in a hurry to discharge them (the brakes).
Under the payment orms championed by Robert Wood Johnson or The Brookings Institution, the inpatient payment bundling would be expanded to pay for the entire case after discharge from the hospital. Under this system, if the case had to be readmitted, the hospital and providers are SOL. After all, why should they be rewarded for shoddy care?
Unless, of course, youre the patient. The DMCB worries that a one-size-fits all approach to payment policy could have unintended consequences. Patients battling unanticipated outcomes would likely per that their providers be incented to give additional care. They want to be back in the hospital.
The payment policy may be good from the point of view of health orm, but it can be bad for patient care.
The DMCB asks if we are on the verge of another round of unintended health care consequences.
Well know soon enough when anecdotes of patients being inappropriately denied readmission begin to appear.
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